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We ask how pension fund trustees deal with the booms and busts that funds encounter, 
and  to  what  extent  the decisions  of  pension  fund  trustees  are  affected  by  behavioral 
biases. We examine these issues by using a vignette-method field  experiment among 
Dutch pension fund trustees. We find that trustees display choices that accord with the 
phenomenon of loss aversion and that trustees allow their choices to be affected by the 
forces of social comparison: the reserve position of their fund compared to the position of 
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1. Introduction 
Pension  funds  worldwide  are  facing  hard  times:  having  lost,  between  January  and 
October  2008,  about  US$3.3  trillion,  or  nearly  20  per  cent  of  the  value  of  their 
accumulated assets (OECD, 2008). Despite the stock market crash, the importance of 
pension  funds  in  many  advanced  countries  is  large,  and  funds  are  essential  to  the 
functioning of the country‟s financial system. The credit crunch has been a wake-up call 
for  pension  funds  on  the  sustainability  of  pension  contracts  and  has  also  moved  the 
question of the governance of pension funds to center stage. In spite of its dominant role 
in  the  financial  systems  and  importance  for  the  financial  well-being  of  millions  of 
pensioners worldwide, knowledge about how pension funds make decisions often only 
touches the surface, interpreting realized investment decisions of funds as the revealed 
preferences of rational and fully informed decision-makers (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995). 
This picture seems at odds with the day-to-day reality of stakeholders in the pension fund 
industry, who generally contract out asset management and pension administration, and 
for  whom  full  information  is  more  a  fund  manager‟s  dream  than  a  reality.  Risk, 
uncertainty,  and  information  asymmetries  abound  and  the  complexity  of  goals  and 
objectives  are  hard  to  grasp,  even  for  insiders,  and  links  with  the  real  and  financial 
markets are difficult to assess. In this world, pension fund trustees – members appointed 
by employers and employees who are entrusted with matching assets and liabilities – 
must cope with the realities of the markets and make decisions.  
  Examining  the  economic  decisions  of  pension  fund  trustees  is  relevant  to 
participants and regulators. Trustees control enormous financial resources. By the end of 
2007,  OECD  pension  funds  assets  reached  the  amount  of  US$17.7  trillion,  which 
represents 64 per cent of the total assets in private pension arrangements (OECD, 2008). 
How the trustees of pension savings allocate the resources has a profound effect on the 
economic growth and societal welfare (Davis and Hu, 2007; Clark, 1998); an increasing 
number of pensioners draw their income from accumulated pension rights managed by 
these trustees, and, given the prospect of ageing societies, the role of trustees is steadily 
gaining in influence.  
  Studies on governance usually focus on the design of boards, but the behavioral 
aspects of pension fund design, trustees‟ decision-making abilities, characteristics, and   2 
effectiveness  are less well researched.  Clark  et al.  (2006, 2007) survey  the decision-
making ability of pension fund trustees in the UK, showing that British pension fund 
trustees lack common approaches relevant to investment decisions and are inconsistent in 
dealing  with  problems  involving  probability  judgment.  Clark  et  al.  (2006)  show  that 
trustees are more cautious with other peoples‟ money than they are with their own. The 
fact that trustees are not professionals has also led to concerns that trustees may lack the 
understanding to judge the advice they receive from finance experts. Clark et al. (2007), 
using UK pension fund governance and the U.S. mutual fund industries as examples, note 
a growing tension between representation and expertise in several fields. The evidence 
presented by them suggests that very few trustees have the competence and consistent 
judgment to challenge the experts who are responsible for executing complex financial 
decisions.  These  findings  raise  the  question  of  how  pension  fund  trustees  do  make 
decisions on the management of the pension fund. 
  In  this  paper  we  build  on  the  behavioral  finance  literature  and  focus  on  the 
decisions of pension fund trustees in the Netherlands. To discover how pension fund 
trustees  make  decisions  and  make  trade-offs  under  demographic  and  economic 
uncertainty we have designed an experiment that uses the vignette method, also known in 
some disciplines as factorial surveys or conjoint analysis. In a vignette study, participants 
are  presented  with  vignettes,  short  descriptions  with  specific  information  randomly 
manipulated  by  the  researcher  (Van  Beek  et  al.,  1997;  Ganong  and  Coleman,  2006; 
Kapteyn et al., 2007; Wallander, 2009). 
  We mimic the dilemmas of the pension fund boardroom and distill the choices 
that board members take in good and bad times. Thus, our paper may offer new insights 
not only on how investment choices are made, but also on how trustees take into account 
demographic and economic risks in pension fund policy. We ask what factors matter in 
decision  making  for  Dutch  pension  fund  trustees.  Trustees  make  complex  decisions, 
balancing  the  interests  of  participants,  sponsors,  and  regulators,  and  these  decisions 
usually take the shape of financial trade-offs. To add to the complexity, these trade-offs 
are both intragenerational and intergenerational (Barr and Diamond, 2006). 
  We analyze how pension fund trustees make trade-offs, and what these trade-offs 
are in the face of demographic, financial and economic shocks. We find that pension fund   3 
trustees are just as likely as ordinary people to display behavioral biases. Trustees are 
more apt to act in bad times to prevent losses than they are in good times in which the 
status quo prevails. This is consistent with the loss aversion phenomenon. Furthermore, 
we find that trustees of both large and small pension funds allow their choices to be 
affected by comparing the reserve position of their fund to the position of other funds. 
This social comparison has a significant influence in trustees' choices of a pension fund 
policy mix. 
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the 
background of the Dutch pension system, and the governance structure of Dutch pension 
funds. Section 3 discusses the data we use, and explains our estimation methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background on Dutch pension system 
Here, we briefly review the background of the Dutch pension system and the governance 
questions  that  dominate  the  ongoing  debate.  The  Dutch  retirement  system,  which, 
according to Ambachtsheer (2006) has a leading role in the world of pension finance, 
comprised  545  funds  in  2008,  managing  €736  billion,  insuring  six  million  active 
members, and 2.5 million retirees (DNB, 2008).  The pension system has three tiers: a 
flat-rate  public  pension  scheme,  the  so-called  old-age  pension  law;  earnings-related 
occupational plans; and private voluntary savings. The first tier, the public pension plan, 
ensures that every Dutch citizen between the ages of 15 and 65 who is living in the 
Netherlands is ensured for a public pension at old age.  
  The second tier, occupational pension schemes, is the focus of our paper, since 
Dutch pension funds' role in securing second-tier pension income is dominant compared 
to that in other countries. Although Dutch employers are not required to offer pension 
schemes to their employees, collective wage agreements are a well-embedded tradition in 
the Dutch labor market. In 2007, occupational pension covered 91 per cent of employees 
in  at  least  some  form.  The  overwhelming  majority  (96  per  cent)  of  all  occupational 
pension  contracts  are  the  average  wage  Defined  Benefit  (DB)  type.  With  DB  plans, 
employees can count on a defined level of retirement income based on their salary and 
years of service, often up to a maximum of 70 per cent of their average gross salary with   4 
40 years of service.  Further, due to lower marginal tax rates in retirement, after-tax 
replacement rates are usually substantially higher. For example, a pre-tax replacement 
rate of 70 per cent is comparable to an after-tax replacement rate that exceeds 85 per cent 
(Alessie  and  Kapteyn,  2001).  The  employer  pays  nearly  80  per  cent  of  occupational 
pension premiums, and the employee pays the remainder. Post-retirement indexing of 
benefits is the rule, since virtually all DB pension contracts offer conditional indexation 
for cost-of-living increases.  
  In  stark  contrast  to  other  Western  countries,  until  the  1990s  the  third  tier, 
voluntary  pension  savings,  played  a  negligible  role  in  Dutch  households.  However, 
voluntary arrangements have begun to emerge. Under these new plans individuals can 
enter into private pension arrangements with an insurance company to “top off” their 
retirement  income.  These  private  savings  plans  are  subsidized  by  the  state  to  cover 
income shortfalls in old age. The role of retirement annuities is also becoming more 
popular among those who seek early retirement.  
  Although the absolute size of pension assets is larger in countries such as the 
U.S.,  UK,  and  Japan,  the  relative  size  of  the  pension  fund  sector  (expressed  as  a 
percentage of GDP) the Dutch pension sector belongs to one of the largest in the world 
(OECD, 2007).  
 
Pension fund governance 
Not  surprisingly,  the  quality  of  pension  fund  management  is  of  great  concern  to  the 
Dutch economy and society. Basic decisions about level of pension premiums, indexing, 
and the investment of pension premiums are delegated to pension funds. At the center of 
the  Dutch  pension  fund  is  the  board  of  trustees,  in  principle  a  bipartisan  board  of 
employer  and  employee  representatives  charged  with  managing  the  pension  fund. 
Members  are  not  elected;  instead,  a  co-optation  model  is  in  place,  under  which 
employers‟ organizations and labor unions appoint the trustees. This model is still in use 
today,  although  changing  balances  in  boards  are  possible,  especially  with  collective 
defined contribution schemes.  
  The management and governance of Dutch pension funds has undergone major 
changes since 2004, when a report on pension fund governance (Boer and Croon, 2004)   5 
questioned  how  effective  and  representative  the  pension‟s  board  of  trustees  was.  An 
outcome of the debate is that since 2007, Dutch pension funds are required to establish a 
participant or accountability board comprised of both active and retired members. The 
participant board acts in an advisory role to the board‟s trustees, and has the right to 
consult with the board on major issues. This consultation is usually focused on the design 
of the pension scheme, the level of contributions or indexations, or the investment policy. 
The  participant  board  cannot  block  the  decisions  of  the  board  or  board  members‟ 
appointments.  Due to the advisory board's composition (active members and retirees), 
commentators regularly express their concerns that the advisory board is a single-issue 
council that focuses on indexation, and thus interferes with the effectiveness of the fund‟s 
management.  
  The accountability board offers critical assessments of the performance of the 
fund,  assesses  the  annual  accounts,  and  ensures  that  the  fund  has  a  well-organized 
administrative system and internal controls.  
  Pension fund knowledge requirements have been stimulated by the Dutch Central 
Bank, which is the pensions regulator, who continues to use education as the means to 
change behavior across  pension schemes. Trustees  are required to comply with  rules 
relating  to  their  knowledge  of  basic  finance  matters  and  understanding  of  the 
requirements.  
 
Value of governance 
The  governance  of  private  pension  plans  and  funds  revolves  around  the  managerial 
control  of  the  organizations  and  how  they  are  regulated,  which  includes  the 
accountability of management and how the managers are supervised (Stewart and Yermo, 
2008). The basic goal of pension fund governance is to minimize the potential agency 
problems that can arise between the fund members and those responsible for the fund‟s 
management; a conflict of interest can adversely affect the security of pension savings 
and promises. Good governance goes beyond this basic goal and aims at delivering high 
pension fund performance while keeping costs low for all stakeholders. Thus, governance 
can have many positive side effects, creating trust amongst stakeholders, reducing the 
need for prescriptive regulation, and facilitating supervision.   6 
  In a study of a sample of large pension funds from six different countries in North 
America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region, Clark and Urwin (2007) conclude that 
their  superior  performance  is  linked  to  strong  governance.  Clark  and  Urwin's  study 
identified various areas where the pension funds that were examined excelled, such as 
clarity of mission, effective risk management, and performance monitoring. Their report 
combines both governance capacity and investment strategy in the overall risk profile of 
the fund, and recommends linking the investment strategy of the fund to the governance 
capability of the board. Boards should first decide whether they are capable of monitoring 
alternative investments effectively before they begin debating on whether to include such 
instruments in their investment strategy. 
  Understanding decision making in the pension fund board room and indirectly 
detecting  the  value  of  pension  fund  governance  would  seem  to  benefit  by  paying 
attention  to  the  vast  expanding  behavioral  finance  literature.  However,  contributions 
within  this  field  of  study  focus  either  on  the  savings  and  investment  strategies  of 
individual workers (cf. Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Cronqvist and Thaler 2004) or, in the 
case of pension and mutual funds, concentrate on defined contribution  plans. Studies 
rarely examine the intricacies that are tied to defined benefit contracts, perhaps because 
the number of discretionary choices at the level of fund management can be quite large 
and the particular institutional setting within which pension funds operate may matter 
greatly.  
  Dutch  pension  funds  are  financial  intermediaries  positioned  as  a  semi-public 
organization  in  the  institutional  framework;  they  are  neither  a  private  investor  nor  a 
government institution. The trustees have a fiduciary role to fulfill the obligations of a 
funded,  defined  benefit  pension  plan,  typically  framed  within  a  compulsory  labor 
agreement.  Therefore,  in  making  their  choices,  the  trustees  must  balance  equity  and 
efficiency  considerations.  The  Dutch  regulators  do  not  directly  influence  decision 
making, but set rules that indirectly restrict choices. For example, the Dutch pension law 
prescribes that pension funds whose ratio of assets to liabilities drops below 105 per cent 
are required to restore their reserves within three to five years. The funds can accomplish 
this aim by decreasing benefits, raising premiums, or cutting administration costs. Or 
funds can reposition the investment portfolio to a one in 40 chance on a yearly basis to let   7 
the assets-to-liabilities ratio drop below the 105 per cent level, thus limiting the riskiness 
of the investment decisions. In addition to the (in)direct influence of the pension regulator 
on decision making, we cannot rule out the presence of peer effects in decision making. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1 Set-up of the study 
As  noted  above,  we  have  collected  our  study  data  by  using  a  vignette  design.  Each 
vignette represents the case of a hypothetical situation that is described by several key 
characteristics,  all  of  which  are  important  to  a  pension  fund  trustee.  We  create  the 
vignettes  by  randomly  combining  characteristics.  An  important  condition  for  using 
vignette-style  surveys  is  that  the  number  of  characteristics  used  should  be  limited, 
because participants are typically unable to process large amounts of information. If the 
researchers introduce too many dimensions, it becomes difficult for the participants to 
clearly visualize the hypothetical person and situation (Rossi and Anderson, 1982). Thus, 
we presented each participant with ten vignettes and asked them to make a hypothetical 
decision for each vignette. By randomly varying the characteristics on the vignettes, we 
were  able  to  determine  the  importance  of  a  particular  characteristic  in  the  decision 
process.
1  
  We performed the survey among pension fund trustees in October and November 
2008. We recruited the trustees from a list of members who took courses on pension fund 
investments and governance. Trustees are required to take these courses to improve their 
knowledge of the pension fund-specific investment characteristics and decision making, 
which is, as noted above, in accordance with pension fund regulations. We also surveyed 
members from the participant and accountability board, but for practical purposes we also 
denote this group as trustees, since we found no discernable differen ce between trustees 
and members from the participant and accountability board in the subsequent analysis. A 
total of 57 trustees (95 per cent male; mean age 61 years) participated. The average 
experience with pension fund management was six years and on av erage trustees spend 
                                                            
1 For a detailed account of the use of vignette studies, see Ganong and Coleman (2006).   8 
12 hours per month on entrusted pension fund issues.
2 A full description of the socio -
economic characteristics and opinions and expectations of the trustees in our sample is 
presented in Table 1. With respect to opinions, the average trustee states that 126 per cent 
reserve ratio is an adequate buffer for pension funds and the replacement rate which 
offers a good pension is 75 per cent of final (net) wage income. 
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
  We conducted the vignette experiment because we wished to  see which factors 
played a role in pension fund decisions. The instructions that accompanied the vignettes 
were as follows:  
 
  “Below you will find ten scenarios which a pension fund may encounter. 
Can  you  give  us  for  each  of  the  scenarios  presented  your  choice  of  what  you 
consider to be an adequate policy reaction?” 
 
  As a note to the question we added, “The ten scenarios are a randomly selected set 
out of a total of 360 possible scenarios. Every participant will therefore get a different set 
of scenarios to evaluate and formulate a policy response.” We presented each participant 
with scenarios that a fictitious pension fund might encounter and asked them, “Can you 
                                                            
2 Before we performed this particular survey, we also conducted a pilot study among 
pension  actuaries  to  see  whether  the  scenario  parameters  were  realistic  enough  for 
participants and whether the policy instruments  mattered. During this pilot study, we 
made a distinction in benefit entitlements for those still working and those who were 
retired. This distinction did not seem to matter for participants making decisions, so we 
dropped this refinement and replaced it with benefit entitlements in general. As a policy 
instrument, we added pension age.   9 
give us for each of the scenarios presented your choice of what you consider to be an 
adequate policy reaction? An example of a scenario is presented in Box 1." 
 
HERE BOX 1 
 
Table  2  gives  the  six  independent  variables  that  characterize  the  vignettes:  life 
expectancy predictions; the expected interest rate; expected inflation rate; the pension 
fund policies of the biggest three pension funds in the Netherlands, thus capturing the 
effect of leadership within the pension fund industry; the actual cover ratio (assets-to 
liabilities ratio) of the pension fund; and the cover ratio of the pension fund relative to 
other funds, thus capturing the effect of social comparison (Camerer and Malmendier, 
2007). Anecdotal evidence shows remarkable similarities in the asset mixes of pension 
funds, despite different liability structures. What trustees at other pension funds decide to 
do is rarely an element that enters finance textbooks, but it would be of some significance 
to detect the presence of such social effects.  
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
Although the number of instruments is relatively large, and although some participants 
took more time to fill out the survey than did others, we received no complaints about the 
complexity of the vignettes.  The majority of the participants took 30 minutes to fill out 
the vignettes and some supplementary questions. The scenarios are more or less evenly 
represented among the group of respondents. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure  1  shows  how  the  participants  use  of  the  five  policy  instruments.  The  middle 
option, i.e., take no specific action with respect to a policy instrument, is the option they 
choose most often. This choice suggests that trustees do not want to change the course in 
pension policy. In other words, the status quo bias may be a decisive element in pension 
fund decision making, a finding that is also evident in the individual investor‟s behavioral 
finance literature  (Thaler, 2005).    10 
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
 
Most of the changes  are made  with  respect  to premiums,  indexing, and investments, 
which we expected for a setting in which pension plans are most often framed in terms of 
defined benefits. Premiums, indexing, and investment are the short-term instruments that 
leave some room for maneuvering within the rules of a defined benefit pension. Benefit 
entitlements and pension age are the instruments that are only changed as a last resort. It 
is  only  during  the  credit  crunch  of  2008  that  for  the  first  time  in  history,  trustees 
considered a reduction of pension entitlements. If pension entitlements are used as an 
instrument,  increases  in  entitlements  (16  per  cent  of  the  cases)  are  more  likely  than 
decreases (5 per cent of the cases). 
 
4.  Are pension fund trustees loss averse? 
Our central question is whether pension fund trustees react differently in good and bad 
times.  That  is,  are they  loss averse  (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)? Do losses  and 
disadvantages  have  a  greater  impact  on  preferences  than  gains  and  advantages?  For 
pension fund policy, loss aversion would show in the actions taken when the reserve ratio 
of the fictitious pension fund varies. Because pension fund trustees are members of non-
profit organizations who govern over the interests of employers and employees, the loss 
in  case of  a pension fund is  the failure to  honor promises  made to  participants.  For 
trustees, the loss can also imply a loss of freedom of choice for trustees. If the ratio of 
assets to liabilities drops below 105, the regulator monitors pension funds‟ activities more 
closely, requiring recovery plan by the trustees and regular financial updates from the 
fund. 
  
4.1 Estimation results 
To estimate the driving forces behind pension fund choices, we use multinomial logit 
analysis  to  examine  the  different  policy  options.  We  have  reduced  the  five  answer 
categories  per  policy  instrument  into  three  categories,  because  for  most  policy 
instruments some answer categories contained small numbers, thereby invalidating the   11 
estimation procedure. For instance, for decisions on the pension premium, we analyze the 
probability that a trustee decides to increase the premium compared with the status quo, 
which would be no change of premium. We also perform this type of analysis with the 
other policy instruments as dependent variable.   
 
HERE TABLE 3 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our analyses on decisions that increase the incidence of a 
decline in pension premiums. Column (1) shows that decrease of the pension premium is 
more likely if there is an unexpected drop in life expectancy. No other coefficients are 
statistically significant. Column (2) shows that an unexpected increase in life expectancy 
increases the probability of an increase in the pension premium.  Hence, the effects of 
demographic shocks appear to be symmetrical, in the sense that a demographic shock that 
reduces  the  liabilities  of  the  pension  fund  leads  to  a  reduction  of  premiums,  but  a 
demographic  shock  that  increases  the  liabilities  also  increases  the  likelihood  that  the 
premium will rise. We do not observe this type of symmetry when we look at other 
statistical significant effects in the model. Most noteworthy are the effects of the reserve 
ratio: a low reserve ratio increases the likelihood of an increase in the premium (see the 
effect in column (2)). If the reserve position increases, then it will lower the chance that 
pension premiums will be raised. A one-percentage point increase in the reserve ratio 
lowers the likelihood of increasing the pension premium by a factor of 0.96. However – 
and here the asymmetry shows up – changes in the reserve ratio do not affect the chance 
of a pension premium decrease.  In other words, a high reserve ratio does not induce a 
reduction of the pension premium.  
The relative reserve position represents the most remarkable element in trustee 
decision making. When pension trustees perceive that their position is better than other 
pension funds, then there is less likelihood of a pension premium increase. We can find 
no  discernable  effect  of  this  peer  group  with  respect  to  the  likelihood  of  a  pension 
premium decrease. 
 
HERE TABLE 4   12 
 
The results in Table 4 show that the effects on the actual reserve ratio are more or less 
symmetric, but for the relative reserve position, the effect is large and asymmetric. With a 
pension fund trustee who perceives the reserve position to be in better shape than other 
pension funds, the chance that a pension fund reneges on its promise to index benefits for 
inflation  is  a  factor  0.46  smaller  compared  to  the  trustee  who  considers  the  reserve 
position to be worse than others.  Further, an increase in the inflation rate also increases 
the probability that indexation will only be partial, or completely absent. The reverse 
position – a structural decrease in the inflation rate – does not encourage trustees to be 
more than generous and give beneficiaries some extra compensation. However, there is 
an effect from the interest rate: an increase in the interest rate for the coming year by one 
percentage point increases the probability of extra compensation by a factor of 1.42. Part 
of this effect may be the result of the logic of the Dutch defined benefit pension schemes, 
in  which  an  increase  in  the  interest  rate  improves  the  reserve  position.  To  give  an 
impression of the size of the effect in the day-to-day life of a pension fund trustee, we 
note  that  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  interest  rate  (or,  to  be  precise,  the 
interbank swap interest rate) increases the reserve position of the average pension fund by 
12 percentage points (Bonenkamp and Ter Rele, 2009). Considering the fact that a one 
percentage point increase in the reserve ratio raises the probability of extra compensation 
by a factor of 1.03, an improvement by 12 percentage points is almost right on target and 
translates into a factor of 1.42. 
Indexing and pension premiums are policy instruments that are often used if the 
economic or demographic situation changes, but we want to determine to what extent 
other instruments are used. Table 5 shows that in the investment portfolio of a pension 
fund, the correlation with relevant pension fund variables is weak and only the reserve 
ratio, in absolute and relative terms, affects investment decisions in a one-sided manner. 
Whenever  the  wealth  position  of  a  fund  deteriorates,  trustees  turn  to  cutting  their 
exposure to risky assets. An increase in pension wealth does not persuade trustees to 
make the investment portfolio riskier. 
 
HERE TABLE 5   13 
 
The question of changing the pension entitlements is a hotly debated topic in times of 
crisis, and the 2008 credit crunch is no exception. Decreasing benefit entitlements goes to 
the heart of the matter of honoring obligations tied to a defined benefit pension contract. 
Beneficiaries may see reneging on this promise in adverse times as a breach of contract, 
and pension funds generally very cautious about discussing this measure of last resort. It 
is in the extreme good and bad times that beneficiaries may realize that a defined benefit 
contract does not differ much from a defined contribution contract, and the financial 
crisis of 2008 has been a painful reminder of that fact.  
 
HERE TABLE 6  
 
Table 6 shows that in terms of the level of the reserve ratio, there is also an asymmetry in 
the ways trustees deal with the good and bad times. The chance that a benefit decrease is 
considered by trustees is lower by a factor of 0.95 than that of a trustee with a pension 
fund that has a reserve ratio that is one percentage point higher. Raising pension benefits 
progresses  at  a  slightly  lower  rate,  but  considering  the  enormous  jumps  in  wealth 
positions during booms and busts, these small ratios translate into relatively large effects 
on the probability of changing benefits. 
There is one other measure of last resort that is also considered in boardrooms and 
government offices: raising the pension age. 
 
HERE TABLE 7 
 
Trustees review this option at some point, but they almost never consider the reverse 
position, lowering the pension age. Table 7 shows that there are essentially two elements 
that trigger trustees to consider raising the pension age: an increase in life expectancy and 
a fall in the reserve ratio of the pension fund. 
 
4.2 Simulation results   14 
The previous estimation results give an impression of the quantitative effects. However, 
the  baseline  probabilities  for  each  of  the  policy  choices  are  absent,  which  makes  it 
difficult to assess the likelihood that policy choices are actually implemented and whether 
trustees are loss averse to a small or a large degree. To facilitate this part of our analysis, 
we present some simulations of pension fund trustees making decisions in good and bad 
times. To clarify the results and to see whether choices differ by trustees being in an 
initially  bad  or  good  state,  we  also  use  the  various  reserve  ratios  to  vary  the  initial 
conditions that pension funds face.  However, reserve ratios are not truly exogenous, but 
within the framework of this  experiment,  in  which trustees  are  asked  for a one-time 
decision, the reserve ratio is, like the other scenario parameters, a fact of life. We define 
the good and bad times as follows: 
 
  Good times: lower than expected life expectancy, better (than other funds) reserve 
level, lower inflation, higher interest rate. 
  Bad times: higher than expected life expectancy, worse (than other funds) reserve 
level, higher inflation, lower interest rate. 
 
Figures 2-6 illustrate the outcomes of the various simulations. Again, we find the most 
striking  outcomes  in  the  policy  instruments  that  trustees  seem  to  use  most  often, 
premiums and indexing.   
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There is a high probability that these instruments will be used in extreme bad times. 
When the reserve ratio drops below the required 105 per cent required by the pension 
regulator, trustees have to act, and the probability is 81 per cent that a trustee will raise 
the  pension  premium  and  90  per  cent  that  the  trustee  will  stop  indexation.    Raising 
pension premiums is no longer a dominant choice for reserve ratios of 130 per cent and 
above.  This  choice  accords  with  the  background  questions  that  we  posed  to  trustees 
whose stated optimal reserve ratio is on average 126 per cent (see Table 1).   15 
In Figure 2, what is more surprising is that under the other extreme situation, the 
good  times  with  a  reserve  ratio  of  170  per  cent,  lowering  pension  premiums  is  not 
trustees' dominant choice; the probability of lowering premiums is only just over 30 per 
cent. We derive the same insights from Figure 3, where the absence of indexation is the 
dominant choice in bad times, but during good times extra compensation is rarely the 
trustee‟s choice. However, we do note that even at the reserve ratio of 130 per cent, 
which is more or less in line with the trustees idea of an optimal reserve position, the 
option of no indexation is still a dominant choice in bad times. In short, there is a strong 
asymmetry in trustees' reactions to good and bad times and the breadth of losses that 
define when trustees are apt to take corrective measures, but in domain of gains the status 
quo prevails. 
  The other policy instruments give an impression of how trustees deal with the 
obligation of honoring a defined benefit contract. The overall impression on portfolio 
choices (Figure 5) is that there is some movement across the spectrum of reserve ratios. 
Trustees become more defensive in their portfolio choices when their reserve ratios drop 
below the required 105 per cent. However, their choices become only marginally more 
risky during the simulated good times. 
  In Figure 5, the option of changing pension entitlements accurately reveals the 
stance of pension fund trustees, since even during extreme bad times the probability that 
pension benefits will be cut is approximately 30 per cent. However, when the very good 
times arrive, increasing pension benefits is considered an option. In good times, when 
there is a reserve ratio of 170 per cent, the probability of raising benefits is 52 per cent. 
 Figure 6 shows that the option of raising the pension age is not a very popular choice, 
even under adverse conditions. When the reserve ratio is 90 per cent and bad times hit the 
pension fund, the chance that the trustee will opt for raising the pension age is only 20 per 
cent. 
 
4.3 Are large pension funds less prone to social comparison effects?  
Pension funds in The Netherlands vary in size, with just a few big pension funds and 
numerous small funds. In matters of pension fund governance, size can facilitate a higher 
level of professionalism in governance, and also in administering and investing pension   16 
premiums. To test the idea that pension size matters in trustees' decision making, we 
repeat our regression analysis, but this time we distinguish between trustees of big and 
small pension funds. It is hard to make a detailed case for where governance pays off. In 
our case, we hypothesize that social comparison effects should be either absent or at least 
smaller among the larger (and thus more professional) funds. The social comparison lies 
mainly in the way pension fund trustees compare their reserve position to that in other 
pension funds. Ideally, a relative reserve position should not matter in making decisions, 
as other funds are not going to bail out floundering funds. Further, in the case of Dutch 
pension  funds,  participants  are  tied  to  a  pension  fund  and  cannot  exert  the  force  of 
competition by moving to some other, perhaps better-funded, pension fund. We define 
the dividing line between big and small funds at €500 million in pension assets. 
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  In Tables 8-10 we present the full estimation results for the most important policy 
instruments. The general outcome of this exercise is that in terms of the relative reserve 
position, social comparison affects the trustees of both large and small pension funds. 
When trustees make pension premium decisions and change the entitlements, the force of 
social comparison is strong among the trustees of large pension funds and completely 
absent among the smaller pension funds. The picture changes slightly if we consider the 
choice of indexing pension benefits.  Here, the trustees of smaller pension funds are more 
apt to  give in to social comparisons than are those serving the larger pension funds. 
However, there is the possibility that larger pension funds may have installed checks and 
balances that dampen or delete these behavioral biases when the individual trustees meet 
in committees and have to reach a consensus. Nevertheless, the fact remains that biases 
are not unknown in members of a large pension fund. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we offer a distillation of the choices pension funds trustees make in times of 
booms and busts. By way of an experiment carried out through a randomly generated set 
of scenarios (the so-called vignette method), we asked trustees to make decisions on an   17 
optimal policy mix consisting of choices with respect to pension premiums, indexation, 
investment, entitlements, and the age of pensioners.  
  Our most important conclusion is the fact that pension funds are just as likely as 
ordinary people to display behavioral biases. Trustees display choices that are in line with 
the phenomenon of loss aversion: trustees are more apt to act in bad times to prevent 
losses than they are in good times in which the status quo prevails. Further, we find that 
trustees of both large and small pension funds allow their choices to be affected by the 
forces of social comparison; the reserve position of their fund compared to the position of 
other funds has a significant influence in trustees' choices of a pension fund policy mix. 
  These findings shed serious doubt on the manner in which pension savings are 
governed. Our findings may also have far-reaching implications for thinking through how 
bounded  rationality  and  the  self-control  problems  of  individuals  can  be  alleviated  in 
everyday life. Empirical patterns of bounded rationality and commitment problems in a 
wide range of settings have led many scholars to question the hostility to paternalism in 
everyday life. The helping hand of the government may not be so bad after all, if it is 
properly  used  and  respects  the  individual's  freedom  of  choice.  "Soft"  or  "libertarian 
paternalism," as Thaler and Sunstein (2003) call it, is the way to go. Pension savings has 
traditionally been a field where most Western governments have felt that some form of 
paternalism  should  be  applied,  and  certainly  the  role  played  by  governments  and 
(mandated) pension funds that act on behalf of employees is prominent in a number of 
OECD economies (OECD, 2008). Behavioral finance research gives ample reasons why 
individual  rationality  and  self-control  are  not  perfect.  It  is  commonly  assumed  that 
government can improve allocations within reasonable bounds and in taking on its soft 
paternalistic  role  it  can  nudge  consumers  in  the  right  direction  by  debiasing  choice, 
changing default rules and other options which change behavior without limiting choice 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2007).  
  However, how the trustees make choices remains to a large extent unknown. The 
question that has not received much attention in the debate about soft paternalism is 
whether the errors of decision making at the level of „governor‟ are smaller than those 
made at the „governed‟, i.e., individual level. The tacit assumption made in models of 
paternalism is that the costs that result from errors made by the government are smaller   18 
than are the costs of errors made by individuals.  For pension savings, the question then 
revolves around whether the errors of pension-fund trustees are smaller than are those 
made  by  individual  employees.  This  issue  goes  right  to  the  heart  of  government-
sponsored inquiries into trustee competence, legislation, and the regulation applied to 
standards and practice of trustee decision making and pension fund governance. In that 
respect,  the  warning  formulated  by  Glaeser  (2006)  that  “soft  paternalism  is  neither 
innocuous nor obviously benign,” is a point well taken and, as our exploratory evidence 
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Box 1: Description of Vignettes for Pension Trustees 
We presented each participant with 10 scenarios that a fictitious pension fund might 
encounter, and asked participants, “Can you give us for each of the scenarios presented 
your choice of what you consider to be an adequate policy reaction? 
Scenario 1:   
   
Prediction life expectancy of CBS    Has been lowered by 2 years 
   
Expected interest rate coming year    Drops one percentage point 
   
Expected inflation rate      
   
Increases structurally by one percentage point 
   
Current reserve level                   150 per cent 
   
Reserve level compared to other fun    Clearly worse 
   
Policies of three biggest pension funds      Introduce major reforms 
 
In your view, in this particular scenario what is the best policy reaction with respect to 
the following instruments? 
Pension premium 
Considerably lower  Somewhat lower  No change  Somewhat higher  Considerably higher 
         
 
Inflation indexing  
No indexing  Partial indexing  Full indexing  Indexing somewhat 
more than inflation rate 
Indexing 
considerably more 
than inflation rate 
         
 
Structure investment portfolio 
Considerably 
less risk 
Somewhat less risk  No change  Somewhat more risk  Considerably more 
risk 
         
 
Entitlements of pensioners 
Considerably 
lower 
Somewhat lower  No change  Somewhat higher  Considerably higher 





Somewhat lower  No change  Somewhat higher  Considerably higher 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of the main variables describing sample of pension fund trustees. 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
     
Age (in years)  61.38  9.52 
Experience (in years)  6.16  5.64 
Hours spent per month on pension fund management  11.86  7.81 
Education
  3.66  1.03 
Wealth pension fund
b  2.83  1.07 
Knowledge
c of:     
   Finance  2.68  0.78 
   Actuarial science  2.22  0.86 
   Statistics  2.64  0.68 
   Management  3.13  0.90 
Stated adequate reserve ratio (assets as % of liabilities)  125.70  9.39 
Stated adequate pension replacement rate (% of final wage)  75.20  8.65 
Expected inflation rate (% points)  2.97  1.63 
Expected interest rate (% points)  4.08  0.85 
Expected life expectancy in 2050 (in years)  83.08  2.30 
Perceived state of the credit crunch crisis
d  3.27  0.98 
 
Notes: N = 57; (a) Education is ranked as (1) primary education; (2) lower vocational 
education (vmbo/mavo/mulo); (3) secondary education (havo/vwo/mbo); (4) higher 
vocational education (hbo); (5) university. 
(b) Wealth pension fund is (1) less than €100 million; (2) €100-500 million; (3) €500-
1000 million; (4) more than €1000 million.  
(c) Knowledge is ranked as  (1) no knowledge; (2) little knowledge; (3) knowledge to 
some extent; (4) considerable knowledge; (5) a lot of knowledge. 
(d) Perceived state of the crisis: "How likely is it that we have seen the worst of the credit 
crisis?" (1) highly likely; (2) likely; (3) neutral; (4) unlikely; and (5) highly unlikely.  23 
Table 2 
Description of pension scenario parameters. The values are randomly combined into 
vignettes.  
 
  Values of the scenario parameters 
Scenario variables:  Base category 
(=0) 
Other values 
1. Life expectancy  Two years lower 
than expected 
Two years higher 
than expected 
 
2. Interest rate coming 
year 
No change  + 1 percentage 
point 
- 1 percentage point 
3. Inflation  No change  + 1 percentage 
point 
- 1 percentage point 
4. Policy other pension 
funds 
No change   Major steps to 
reform 
 
5. Relative reserve 
position 
Worse than others  Better than others   
6. Reserve ratios: 
liabilities as % of assets 
90; 110; 130; 150; 170 
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Table 3  
How do pension fund trustees decide on pension premiums in the face of demographic 
and economic changes? “No change in premiums” is the comparison category.
a  Relative 
risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of being in the categories “decrease 
pension premium” or “raise pension premium” rather than the comparison category 
associated with a one-unit change on the independent variable. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will: 
  (1)  (2) 
  Decrease pension premium  Raise pension premium 
  RRR  t-value  RRR  t-value 
Life expectancy  0.36**  2.66  1.64*  2.22 
Interest rate  1.18  0.90  0.86  1.11 
Inflation  0.77  1.28  1.16  1.21 
Policy others  0.88  0.38  1.04  0.23 
Relative reserve position  1.27  0.83  0.65*  2.14 
Reserve ratio  1.01  1.23  0.96**  7.57 
Observations  554 
Pseudo R
2  0.16 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
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Table 4 
How do pension fund trustees decide on indexing of pension benefits in the face of 
demographic and economic changes?  “No change in indexing” is the comparison 
category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of being in the 
categories “No or partial indexing” or  “extra compensation” rather than the comparison 
category associated with a one-unit change on the independent variable. 
 
 
  Chance that pension funds will offer: 
  (1)  (2) 
  No or partial indexing  Extra indexing 
  RRR  t-value  RRR  t-value 
Life expectancy  1.34  1.25  0.67  1.21 
Interest rate  0.89  0.86  1.42*  2.07 
Inflation  1.36**  2.69  1.15  0.99 
Policy others  1.14  1.65  1.21  0.79 
Relative reserve position  0.46**  3.93  1.47  1.42 
Reserve ratio  0.96**  5.97  1.03**  3.38 
         
Observations  554 
Pseudo R
2  0.18 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
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Table 5 
How do pension fund trustees decide on the risk of the investment portfolio in 
confronting demographic and economic changes. “No change in investment portfolio” is 
the comparison category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of 
being in the categories “make the investment portfolio more risky” or  “make the 
investment portfolio less risky” rather than the comparison category associated with a 
one-unit change on the independent variable. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will invest in assets that are: 
  (1)  (2) 
  Less risky  More risky 
  RRR  t-value  RRR  t-value 
Life expectancy  0.75  1.18  0.69  1.80 
Interest rate  1.02  0.13  0.78  1.89 
Inflation  0.91  0.76  0.84  1.14 
Policy others  1.08  0.34  1.33  1.51 
Relative reserve position  0.62*  2.11  0.89  0.45 
Reserve ratio  0.98**  2.93  1.00  0.20 
Observations  554 
Pseudo R
2  0.04 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
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Table 6 
How do pension fund trustees decide on pension benefit entitlements in the face of 
demographic and economic changes? “No change in benefit levels” is the comparison 
category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of being in the 
categories “decrease pension benefits” or  “raise pension benefits” rather than the 
comparison category associated with a one-unit change on the independent variable. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will: 
  (1)  (2) 
  Decrease pension benefits  Raise pension benefits 
  RRR  t-value  RRR  t-value 
Life expectancy  0.89  0.29  0.66  1.72 
Interest rate  0.66  1.92  1.26  1.65 
Inflation  1.52  1.67  0.71*  2.40 
Policy others  0.90  0.29  1.18  0.68 
Relative reserve position  0.88  0.32  1.17  0.64 
Reserve ratio  0.95**  4.01  1.03**  5.63 
Observations  554 
Pseudo R
2  0.14 
 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
 
 
   28 
Table 7 
How do pension fund trustees decide on pension age in the face of demographic and 
economic changes? The odds ratio
 a represents the change in the odds of being in the 
category “raise pension age” compared to the category “no change in pension change”, 
associated with a one unit change on the independent variable. 
 
  Raise pension age (no change = 0) 
  Odds ratio  t-value 
Life expectancy  2.16**  2.83 
Interest rate  1.23  1.29 
Inflation  0.95  0.41 
Policy others  1.38  1.10 
Relative reserve position  0.83  0.71 
Reserve ratio   0.98**  2.83 
Observations  548 
Pseudo R
2  0.05 
(a) Method of analysis is logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
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Table 8 
Pension fund trustees deciding on pension premiums when confronting demographic and 
economic changes, by pension size. “No change in premiums” is the comparison 
category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of being in the 
categories “decrease pension premium” or  “raise pension premium” rather than the 
comparison category associated with a one-unit change on the independent variable. 
Small pension funds have assets below 500 million euro; large pension funds more than 
500 million euro. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will: 
  Decrease pension premium  Raise pension premium 
  Small funds  Large funds  Small funds  Large funds 
         
Life expectancy  -2.33***  -0.75  0.75  0.01 
  (3.10)  (1.31)  (2.10)  (0.01) 
Interest rate  0.13  0.48  -0.24  -0.25 
  (0.56)  (1.45)  (1.20)  (0.95) 
Inflation  -0.06  -0.46  -0.05  0.34 
  (0.17)  (1.47)  (0.29)  (1.22) 
Policy others  0.11  -0.16  -0.13  0.21 
  (0.21)  (0.33)  (0.68)  (0.73) 
Relative reserve position  0.04  0.57  0.08  -0.96*** 
  (0.10)  (1.18)  (0.32)  (3.21) 
Reserve ratio  0.02  0.03  -0.05***  -0.05*** 
  (1.03)  (1.38)  (4.89)  (5.21) 
Constant  -4.21  -5.74**  4.63  6.28*** 
  (1.49)  (2.16)  (4.83)  (4.83) 
         
Pseudo R
2  0.21  0.24  0.21  0.24 
Observations
  291  191  291  191 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
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Table 9 
Pension fund trustees deciding on indexing when confronting demographic and economic 
changes, by pension size (Base category = indexation). “No change in indexing” is the 
comparison category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of 
being in the categories “No or partial indexing” or  “extra compensation” rather than the 
comparison category associated with a one unit change on the independent variable. 
Small pension funds have assets below 500 million euro; large pension funds more than 
500 million euro. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will offer: 
  No or partial indexing  Extra compensation 
  Small funds  Large funds  Small funds  Large funds 
Life expectancy  0.52  -0.01  -0.21  -0.81 
  (1.38)  (0.02)  (0.43)  (1.45) 
Interest rate  -0.06  -0.28  0.25  0.31 
  (0.32)  (1.28)  (1.28)  (0.91) 
Inflation  0.36*  0.13  0.19  0.06 
  (1.87)  (0.66)  (1.19)  (0.17) 
Policy others  0.25  0.01  0.66**  -0.35 
  (0.70)  (0.03)  (2.12)  (0.83) 
Relative reserve position  -0.97***  -0.53*  0.73*  0.56 
  (3.17)  (1.67)  (1.84)  (1.17) 
Reserve ratio  -0.05***  -0.04***  0.02*  0.06*** 
  (5.69)  (3.29)  (1.80)  (4.27) 
Constant  6.47  5.65**  -4.65  -10.70** 
  (4.97)  (3.55)  (2.92)  (4.63) 
         
Pseudo R
2  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.24 
Observations
  291  191  291  191 
 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
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Table 10 
Pension fund trustees deciding on pension benefit entitlements when confronting 
demographic and economic changes, by pension size. “No change in benefit levels” is the 
comparison category.
 a Relative risk ratios (RRR) represent the change in the odds of 
being in the categories “decrease pension benefits” or  “raise pension benefits” rather 
than the comparison category associated with a one-unit change on the independent 
variable.  
Small pension funds have assets below 500 million euro; large pension funds more than 
500 million euro. 
 
  Chance that pension funds will: 
  Decrease pension benefits  Raise pension benefits 
  Small funds  Large funds  Small funds  Large funds 
Life expectancy  -0.00  -0.59  -0.64  -0.61* 
  (0.00)  (0.88)  (1.38)  (1.69) 
Interest rate  -0.37  -0.50  0.52**  0.04 
  (0.32)  (1.08)  (2.13)  (0.14) 
Inflation  0.56*  0.07  -0.12  0.60** 
  (1.71)  (0.13)  (0.76)  (1.93) 
Policy others  -0.24  0.45  0.51  0.13 
  (0.49)  (0.68)  (0.93)  (0.49) 
Relative reserve position  0.16  -0.89  0.10  0.92*** 
  (0.30)  (0.96)  (0.22)  (2.68) 
Reserve ratio  -0.05***  -0.07***  0.03***  0.05*** 
  (2.74)  (3.54)  (3.23)  (5.45) 
Constant  2.40  5.43**  -6.39***  -8.53*** 
  (1.58)  (2.30)  (4.42)  (6.65) 
         
Pseudo R
2  0.14  0.24  0.14  0.24 
Observations
  291  191  291  191 
 
(a) Method of analysis is multinomial logit analysis 
 
*Significance at 5% 
** Significance at 1% 
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Figure 1 
Frequency distribution per pension policy instrument. For the variables “premium”, 
”benefits” and ”pension age” the numbers denote: (1) considerably lower; (2) lower; (3) 
no change; (4) higher; (5) considerably higher. For the variable ”indexation”, they 
denote: (1) no indexation; (2) partial indexation; (3) full indexation; (4) somewhat more 
than inflation; (5) considerably more indexation than inflation rate. For the variable 
”portfolio” the numbers denote: (1) considerably less risk; (2) less risk; (3) no change; (4) 
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Figure 2 
Pension premium choices in good and bad times. The figure shows per cover ratio the 
probability that trustees raise premiums in bad times, compared to the probability that 





   34 
Figure 3 
Indexing choices in good and bad times. The figure shows per cover ratio the probability 
that trustees grant no indexation in bad times, compared to the probability that trustees 
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Figure 4 
Investment choices in good and bad times. The figure shows per cover ratio the 
probability that trustees opt for an investment portfolio with less risk in bad times, 
compared to the probability that trustees opt for an investment portfolio with more risk in 
good times. 
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Figure 5 
Changing pension entitlements in good and bad times. The figure shows per cover ratio 
the probability that trustees cut pension benefits in bad times, compared to the probability 
that trustees increase pension benefits in good times. 
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Figure 6  
Raising pension age in good and bad times. The figure shows per cover ratio the 
probability that trustees raise the pension age in bad times, compared to the probability 
that trustees raise the pension age in good times. 
 
 
 
 